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There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such
accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into
my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a de-
lusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if
we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we
should split the ﬁrst factor (1 above) into two factors: how abnormal experience can give rise to a delusional
‘proto-hypothesis’ and how a ‘proto-hypothesis’ in consort with normal experiences and background infor-
mation, can be developed into a delusional hypothesis. In particular I will argue that a schizophrenic is
faced with the unusual requirement of having to identify an introspectively accessible thought as one's
own, and that this requirement of identiﬁcation is the central experiential abnormality of thought insertion,
auditory verbal hallucination, and alien control (i.e. passivity symptoms). Additionally, I will consider
non-experiential factors which are required for the formation of a delusional hypothesis.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Background/introduction
Schizophrenia has attracted attention from philosophers of mind
and philosophers of cognitive psychology largely because the passivity
symptoms of thought insertion and alien control challenge some of
the most intuitive beliefs we have about what is an adequate source of
justiﬁcation for our self-knowledge. (I will take ‘self-knowledge’ to
mean introspection-based knowledge of one's thoughts and actions.)
The intuitive view is that if I receive information about my own
thoughts and movements on the basis of introspective information,
this is sufﬁcient to know (1) what sort of thinking or action I am
engaged in and (2) that it is me who is doing the thinking and acting.
However, the schizophrenic symptoms of thought insertion and alien
control appear to bring the second claim into question: that introspec-
tive information is sufﬁcient for knowing it is me who is doing the
thinking and acting, and not someone else (e.g. see Campbell, 1999).
My aim in this article is to provide an explanation of abnormal expe-
rience for the passivity symptoms of schizophrenia. I will argue that
what is essential to understanding these symptoms is that they result
from an unusual requirement placed on the schizophrenic: a need to
identify who is the agent of one's own thoughts and actions. I will
argue that this requirement of identiﬁcation is the central feature of
the abnormal experience associated with passivity symptoms. As I
take the fundamental aspects of the abnormal experience underlying
passivity symptoms to be the same, I will focusmy attention on thought
insertion—mentioning alien control and auditory verbal hallucination
when discussion of such cases is helpful. I will offer this explanation
by expanding on a ‘two-factor’ account used to explain delusions by
Davies and Coltheart (2000).
2. Monothematic delusions, two-, and three-factor accounts
As noted by Davies and Coltheart (2000) several delusions can be
categorized as monothematic in that they focus on a central theme
(Davies et al., 2001). Examples of monothematic delusions include
Capgras Delusion (the belief that individuals close to the person
have been replaced by imposters) reduplicative paramnesia (an arm
[attached to me] is someone else's and that person has three arms),
the Cotard Delusion (the belief that I am dead), thought insertion,
and alien control. Monothematic delusions are contrasted with
polythematic delusions which focus on several themes and interact
signiﬁcantly with one's other beliefs. Schizophrenia often involves
several kinds of delusions, including polythematic paranoid delu-
sions. However, Davies and Coltheart are not attempting to character-
ize mental disorders such as schizophrenia, but rather the feasibility
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of a general framework for explaining delusions which focus on a cen-
tral theme.
Davies' and Coltheart's project is thus signiﬁcantly different than
projects concerning etiological explanations of particular syndromes.
For instance, Capgras Delusion has been witnessed in subjects with sev-
eral disorders, including AIDS, Alzheimer's disease, epilepsy, Lewy-body
dementia, multiple sclerosis, pituitary tumor, schizophrenia, and viral
encephalitis (Coltheart et al., 2007). Regardless of the different neuropa-
thologies that give rise to similar delusional claims,we can still provide a
uniform cognitive explanation as to why delusions focusing on a central
theme are made.
The two-factor account of monothematic delusions requires of
cognitive accounts of monothematic delusions that they address the
following two claims. In regards to any delusional hypothesis we
must explain:
1. why a delusional hypothesis is a “prima facie reasonable response
to the subject's experience”, and
2. how one can adopt and maintain a delusional hypothesis given its
“utter implausibility and the uniform skepticism with which other
people greet it?” (Davies and Coltheart, 2000).
The two-factor account assumes that monothematic delusions
have their origins in abnormal experience. Thus, there is the common
presumption that monothematic delusions cannot result solely from
abnormal reasoning. Among those who hold that monothematic de-
lusions result from abnormal experience, researchers are divided
into those that think delusional beliefs are rational responses to ab-
normal experience (e.g. Maher, 1974, 1988, 1992, 1999) and those
who think that delusional beliefs are irrational responses to abnormal
experience (e.g. Stone and Young, 1997; Davies and Coltheart, 2000;
Coltheart et al., 2007; Coltheart, 2013). While both camps are capable
of giving two-factor accounts, the ﬁrst camp will explain the second
factor in terms of normal reasoning and continuing abnormal experi-
ence1 whereas the second camp will explain the second factor in
terms of abnormal reasoning alone. (As my concern is just with
abnormal experience and how it can lead to the formation of a delu-
sional hypothesis I will elaborate primarily on the ﬁrst factor.)
Granting this central role given to abnormal experience in account-
ing for delusion formation, we might ask how a delusional hypothesis
can be a prima facie reasonable response to an abnormal experience. I
take the demands onwhatmakes a response to an abnormal experience
prima facie reasonable to be quiteminimal. For instance, having a hallu-
cination of aminiature pink elephant provides onewith prima facie rea-
son for believing that there is a pink elephant. Of course, this belief is
easily defeated by other considerations — that's why it is just a prima
facie reasonable response. However, having a hallucination of a pink
elephant does not provide me with prima facie reason for believing
that good golfers make horrible mathematicians. We might say that in
order for a response to an experience to be prima facie reasonable, the
response (e.g. a belief or hypothesis), has to adequately represent the
experience the individual is presented with. This account of prima
facie reasonableness places the following explanatory burden on us:
whatever account of abnormal experience is given, we must be able to
give an account of it such that some delusional hypotheses can be
taken to adequately represent the experience whereas other hypothe-
ses cannot.
A problemwith theﬁrst factor of the two-factor account is that it has
an ambiguity that can result in an explanatory inadequacy: the ﬁrst fac-
tor does not disambiguate whether a proper explanation should be one
which explains how the delusional hypothesis is a prima facie reason-
able response to either (1) just an abnormal experience or (2) an abnor-
mal experience in addition to normal experiences and background
information. Problems arise if we adopt the ﬁrst approach as it will
demand a highly intricate abnormal experience to bring about the delu-
sional hypothesis. We can see this demand in the following characteri-
zation of the abnormal experience involved in thought insertion:
One central phenomenon of the “psychosis of thinking”…is
thought insertion… in which the patient feels that alien thoughts
are being inserted into his mind
[Campbell, 1999, 615.]
In this account, the abnormal experience is supposed to be cap-
tured by the description of the feeling ‘that alien thoughts are being
inserted into his mind’. If one could have a feeling which is properly
described as ‘alien thoughts are being inserted into my mind’, then
the delusional hypothesis ‘alien thoughts are being inserted into my
mind’ would adequately represent that experience and thus be a
prima facie reasonable response to this abnormal experience. But
without a previous experience of (real) alien thoughts and (real)
thought insertion, how would we be able to describe such a feeling?2
To reduce the demand for a highly intricate abnormal experience,
as required by the former interpretation mentioned above, we can
disambiguate the ﬁrst factor in the following way:
0. What delusional proto-hypothesis can be understood as a
prima facie reasonable response to the subject's abnormal
experience?
1′. How can we explain the development of a delusional hypothesis
in light of the subject's delusional proto-hypothesis, inferences,
normal experiences, and background information?
By ‘proto-hypothesis’ I mean a hypothesis which is a prima facie
reasonable response to just the subject's abnormal experience. As
such, a delusional proto-hypothesis serves as an explanatory interme-
diary between abnormal experience and the adopted delusional
hypothesis. As such, there is no expectation that the delusional
proto-hypothesis be explicitly entertained by the subject in ques-
tion. The proto-hypothesis will aid in an explanation of what can
be a reasonable response to an abnormal experience (captured by
the 0 factor) and what inferences, normal experiences, and back-
ground assumptions can lead to the development of a delusional hy-
pothesis (captured by the 1′ factor).3,4 Whereas this account allows
us to posit a simpler (i.e. more plausible) abnormal experience
than Campbell's account above, we must then do extra work to
explain how a delusional hypothesis is formed.
3. Passivity symptoms, explanatory challenges, and
corollary discharge
As I have now characterized the framework within which I will
discuss monothematic delusions in schizophrenia, I will now address
1 Maher has theorized that it is repeated abnormal experiences that result in the for-
mation and maintenance of delusional beliefs. As such, he accounts for the ﬁrst and
second factor of monothematic delusions by appealing to abnormal experience
(Maher, 1999, 566). In what follows, I agree with Maher in terms of accounting for
the ﬁrst factor: schizophrenics exhibit sufﬁcient rationality, that the simplest explana-
tion for the formulation of a delusional hypothesis need not invoke failures of rational-
ity in addition to abnormal experience. For reasons beyond the scope of this paper, I do
not think that the maintenance of delusional hypothesis can be given a similar ‘rational’
account given the tendency of delusional schizophrenics to adopt beliefs on the basis of
minimal positive evidence (see e.g. Langdon et al., 2010; Moritz and Woodward, 2005;
Colbert and Peters, 2002; Young and Bentall, 1997; Garety et al., 1991; Huq et al., 1988).
2 Contrast this with the task of describing an auditory verbal hallucination. While
such hallucinatory experiences are often not experientially identical with hearing nor-
mal speech, such experiences can at least be approximately described by appeal to the
ordinary experience of hearing speech.
3 If there are cases where a delusional hypothesis can be formed solely on the basis
of abnormal experience, the proto-hypothesis will just be the delusional hypothesis.
4 The factors on the three-factor account are labeled ‘0’, ‘1′’, and ‘2’. I start with ‘0’ so
that the factor labeled ‘2’, which is the same on both accounts, need not be relabeled.
The second factor on the three-factor account is labeled ‘1′’ so as not to be confused
with the ﬁrst factor of the two-factor account labeled ‘1’.
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a few challenges that should be met by an adequate explanation of
the abnormal experience associated with passivity symptoms. Take
the following report of thought insertion:
… it seemed to be her own thought “…but I don't get the feeling
that it is.” She said her “own thoughts might say the same thing
… but the feeling isn't the same … the feeling is that it is some-
body else's….”
[Allison-Bolger 1999, #8, qtd. in Hoerl, 2001.]
This report is slightly atypical in that what is often expressed is the
accepted delusional hypothesis that someone (in particular) is inserting
thoughts into my head. Given the difﬁculty of attempting to explain an
abnormal experience that most non-schizophrenics have never had,5 I
think that at least the following two explanatory challenges must be
met.
First, on my revised three-factor approach, we must provide
explanations for factors 0 and 1′ separately. Second, the characteriza-
tion of abnormal experience should be such that it can reasonably be
seen as the result of a cognitive, as opposed to neurological, deﬁcit. As
the two- and three-factor accounts do not attempt to address the
etiologies that give rise to delusions, defenders of these accounts are
not required to provide a non-cognitive explanation of passivity
symptoms. Before addressing these challenges, I will outline what I
take to be the cognitive deﬁcit involved in passivity symptoms that
the abnormal experience must be correlated with.
The leading model used to account for the cognitive deﬁcit asso-
ciated with passivity symptoms posits a failure of self-monitoring
(i.e. corollary discharge/efferent copy theory). We can ﬁnd a highly
elaborated version of this model in Frith (1992), although the
attempt to explain thought insertion in terms of failures of self mon-
itoring can ﬁrst be found in Feinberg (1978).6 The idea of corollary
discharge being central to explanations of passivity symptoms is
still a popular approach being pursued in psychopathology research,
e.g. Whitford et al., 2012 and Thakkar et al., 2013.7
Here is a version of the corollary discharge/efferent copy theory for
passivity symptoms. Thought, subvocalization, and bodily movement
are all, at least partially, the results of unconscious generative instruc-
tion. When these instructions generate thought, subvocalizations, or
bodily movement, an efferent copy (i.e. a corollary discharge) of these
instructions is made and sent to a comparator. Once the ‘action’ is
performed (i.e., a thought, a subvocalization, or a bodily movement),
feedback on how this action is beingperformed (reafferent information)
is also sent to the comparator. When the information in these two
streams of information ‘matches’ thoughts, subvocalizations, and bodily
movements are experienced as one's own.8 However, in schizophrenics,
the information in the efferent copy is delayed (Whiteford et al., 2012)
in its arrival to the comparator. Nevertheless, the reafferent information
does arrive at the comparator ‘on time’. It is posited that this lack of
matching information is what correlates with the abnormal experience
in passivity symptoms.
In Sections 4 and 5, I will provide an explanation of the abnormal
experience that gives rise to passivity symptoms, explain how these ex-
periences can be the source of a prima facie reasonable delusional
proto-hypothesis, how that proto-hypothesis can lead to a delusional
hypothesis, and why the positive account of abnormal experience that
I give can be plausibly correlated to the corollary discharge/efferent
copy deﬁcit in schizophrenia.
4. From the top, down: arguing for a characterization of
abnormal experience
As I expressed earlier (fn. 2), I believe that part of an account of how
a delusional hypothesis is generated will involve a delusional proto-
hypothesis and reasonable inferences from that proto-hypothesis to a
delusional hypothesis. As such, the strategy I will use here is to ﬁrst
‘explain away’ features of the delusional hypothesis that can be
explained in terms of rational inferences. Doing sowill allowus to arrive
upon a proto-hypothesis. I will then be able to provide a minimally in-
tricate characterization of what the abnormal experience must be like
if we are to account for the delusional proto-hypothesis. In Section 5, I
will explain how this characterization can be plausibly correlated with
our explanation of cognitive deﬁcit.
Take the delusional belief that a thought in my head is my brother
Bob's thought. I might think that it is Bob inserting thoughts into my
head because the thought has a content like ‘this is Bob’ or some other
content that would be the kind of thought that Bob might express to
me. Alternatively, my thought might be accompanied with auditory
imagery that makes it as if Bob were talking to me. These features
of thought could lead me to believe that this thought in my head
that is not mine is in fact Bob's thought. Without these explanations
which allow us to ascribe the thought to a particular person, we are
left with the simpler delusional claim that a thought in my head is
somebody else's.
However, this simpler delusion hypothesis, i.e. that a thought in
my head is someone else's, can also be ‘explained away’. In virtue of
having introspective access to a thought, I can reasonably claim that
the thought I am experiencing is ‘in my head’. However, if I also
think the thought isn't mine, but there is nevertheless a thought in
my head, it stands to reason that it is somebody else's. Thoughts,
after all, have to have thinkers.
We are now left with a simpler delusional claim: that a thought I
am introspectively experiencing is not mine. Even this hypothesis is
still too robust to be a prima facie reasonable response to, solely, an
abnormal experience. But in order to see why a bit of philosophical
terminology needs to be introduced.
Let p stand for the content of a thought. If schizophrenics, on the
basis of the introspective experience of a thought p, believe that
someone else is thinking p, we can say that they have made an
introspection-based error through misidentiﬁcation: that is, while
they are correct about what is being thought, viz. p, they have
misidentiﬁed whom it is that is doing the thinking. If one is to
make an error of misidentiﬁcation, three things are required: (1)
an act of identiﬁcation has to be possible, (2) there has to be an at-
tempt at identiﬁcation, and (3) one has to fail at that attempt. Mak-
ing this sort of error could be quite commonplace, for instance, in
the case where one is trying to remember which of one's colleagues
provided you with some information. However, what is strange
about the introspective access case is that we might have thought
that when it comes to introspection-based ascriptions, we are im-
mune to error through misidentiﬁcation (IEM). A philosophical lesson
we have learned fromWittgenstein (1958) and Shoemaker (1968) is
that when we make introspection-based self-ascriptions we are IEM.
In other words, if on the basis of my introspection-based information
5 Karl Jaspers (1923/1963, 93–104) had this concern as well: if it is not possible to
empathize with schizophrenics' abnormal experiences, what chance do we have of un-
derstanding those experiences?
6 There have been substantial attempts to modify Frith et al.'s (2000) model of the
neurocognitive action self-monitoring system in order to account for auditory verbal
hallucination in Seale et al., 2004; and Jones and Fernyhough, 2007. While Frith (Frith
and Gallagher, 2002) no longer endorses his 1992 model, I take it to be essentially cor-
rect in placing deﬁcits of self-monitoring at the center of an explanation of abnormal
phenomenology of passivity symptoms.
7 Thakkar et al. (2013) in particular have provided excellent functional evidence for
corollary discharge malfunction in the oculomotor system of schizophrenics with pos-
itive symptoms.
8 And at least in the case of bodily movement, when there are slight mismatches, e.g.
when the reafferent information suggests the action is deviating from the original in-
structions, new instructions are sent to readjust the actions being performed (Megaw,
1972). Regardless of the slight mismatch, the actions are still taken to be one's own.
Nasrallah (2012) has helpfully suggested that we can think of a breakdown of self-
monitoring as a breakdown of mental proprioception, analogous to physical proprio-
ception. This aids us in explaining how thought insertion, like alien control, can result
from a breakdown of self-monitoring.
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that a thought p is being entertained, I self-ascribe the thought that p,
it is not possible that I could have made an error. The reason I do not
fail at an attempt of identiﬁcation (3 above) is because there is no
attempt at identiﬁcation (2 above); and, the reason I do not attempt
an identiﬁcation is because it is not possible to perform an act of
identiﬁcation (1 above).9,10
What is important to keep in mind is that not having a need to
identify who is thinking a thought is the hallmark of introspection-
based self-ascriptions of thought. Coming to know a thought via in-
trospection and not performing an act of identiﬁcation is what leads
to the self-ascription of thought.
However, a report of thought insertion, or alien control, is by
deﬁnition an error through misidentiﬁcation. This means that an
introspection-based delusional hypothesis that this thought is not
mine is the result of a misidentiﬁcation. Additionally—and this is
the essential point—, if there is a misidentiﬁcation, then it was pos-
sible for the subject to perform an act of identiﬁcation. And given
that it is a hallmark of regular thought that no act of identiﬁcation
is required in ascribing a thought to oneself, the mere possibility
of performing such an act would give a subject prima facie reason
to ascribe the thought to someone else.
We can now see that the delusional hypothesis ‘this thought I am
introspectively experiencing is not mine’ results from an abnormal
experience and the reasonable inference just mentioned. Namely,
the inference is that if I have to identify whose thought this is, then
it is not mine.
This suggests thatwe can formulate our delusional proto-hypothesis
as follows: this thought p that I am introspectively experiencing re-
quires identiﬁcation. I take this proto-hypothesis to be delusional in
that introspection-based thoughts are always one's own.11 Neverthe-
less, I will argue that it is a prima facie reasonable response to the abnor-
mal experience.
And what can we say of this experience? We can say that the ab-
normal experience which serves as the basis for the proto-hypothesis
is such that it raises the issue/possibility of identiﬁcation. That is, the
sufferer of thought insertion, or alien control, must have an abnormal
feeling which raises the issue of whose thought, or action, it is that is
currently being introspectively experienced. I will now explain why it
is this account of the abnormal experience involved in passivity
symptoms that should be correlated with a disruption in corollary
discharge.
5. From the bottom, up: correlating abnormal experience with
cognitive deﬁcit
On the corollary dischargemodel, in the case of regular thought and
action, no issue of identiﬁcation is raised. We can correlate this with a
match or near match at the comparator between the efferent copy
and reafferent—or in some cases exafferent (i.e. visual feedback)—
information. In the case of thought insertion or alien control, when
there is a delayed efferent copy, reafferent information is still received
at the comparator. In the case of hearing a voice or moving one's arm,
this reafferent information is quite similar to the information that
would be received if someone else was speaking or someone else
moved one's arm. So if one still received reafferent information (via pro-
prioception or the auditory loop) without an efferent copy, the sensation
would be very similar to one in which someone else was moving one's
arm, or speaking. As there is no external correlate for someone else ‘mov-
ing’ my thoughts, the sensation would be even stranger, and one that
non-schizophrenics have no analogue for. So thinking, hearing, or mov-
ing in cases with a delayed efferent copy and ‘on time’ reafferent infor-
mation could result in a feeling that we might describe as raising an
issue of identiﬁcation. The feeling that identiﬁcation is required in the
case of thought insertion and alien control, is a feeling of unfamiliarity
in what should be a familiar domain. Additionally, having to perform
an act of identiﬁcation could make it seem as if one's special status
with regard to one's own thoughts and actions has been removed. This
may lead to what has been called ‘diminished self-affection’, i.e. a dimin-
ished sense of having a ﬁrst-person perspective (Sass and Parnas, 2003,
2007; Sass et al., 2011).
I have now addressed the second challenge mentioned above:
how we should correlate abnormal experience with cognitive deﬁcit
in passivity symptoms. I will now return to the ﬁrst challenge: how
to account for delusional hypotheses in thought insertion in terms
of the 0 and 1′ factors outlined above.
6. An outline of a three-factor account of Passivity symptoms
On the three-factor account, the abnormal aspect of thought inser-
tion, and alien control, is such that it raises an issue of identiﬁcation.
This leads to the formation of a prima facie reasonable response in the
form of a delusional proto-hypothesis: this thought p that I am intro-
spectively experiencing requires identiﬁcation. To explain the next
factor (1′), I have argued that this proto-hypothesis can then be modi-
ﬁed by a series of fairly reasonable inferences. First, if a thought requires
identiﬁcation, then it is not mine. Second, given that thoughts have
thinkers, if this thought is not mine, then it must be someone else's.
Third, given the possibility of information in the content of the thought
or perhaps auditory or visual imagery present in the thought, it might
be assigned to someone else in particular. Finally, since this thought is
nevertheless one that I have introspective access to, it seems that a
prima facie reasonable delusional hypothesis could be that Bob has
inserted this thought that p into my head.
I hope I have presented a compelling reason to adopt a three-factor
account of monothematic delusions given its greater explanatory
power. More importantly, however, I hope to have presented a compel-
ling picture of how we might correlate abnormal experience with
cognitive deﬁcits and the dangers of attempting to directly correlate
an abnormal experience with a fully developed delusional hypothesis.
I have in several ways tried to accommodate some of Brendan Maher's
intuitions by showing that the inferences involved in explaining the 1′
factor of passivity symptoms could solely involve several steps of nor-
mal reasoning in response to abnormal experience. Nevertheless, I am
in agreement with Davies' and Coltheart's claim that the full adoption
and maintenance of a delusional hypothesis will be partially explained
by reasoning abnormalities.12
Role of the funding source
None.
Contributors
None.
9 To use one of Wittgenstein's examples, if I have a toothache, the following ques-
tion would not arise “there is a toothache going on, but is it mine?”Wittgenstein con-
tinues, “there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have a toothache.”
(Wittgenstein, 1958, 67). And “My use of the word ‘I’ as the subject of my statement
is not due to my having identiﬁed as myself something of which I know, or believe, or
which to say, that the predicate of my statement applies to it” (Shoemaker, 1968,
558). Immunity to error does not come from any skill in identiﬁcation. It comes from
not having to identify at all.
10 I should note a difference that is sometimes overlooked by philosophers: schizo-
phrenics are not in violation of Shoemaker's thesis that introspection-based self-
ascriptions are IEM. This is because in thought insertion and alien control schizo-
phrenics are making ascriptions to others.
11 Perhaps there are some highly unlikely or rare physiological stories, such that of
certain cranial conjoined twins that would, at least for actions if not thoughts, bring
the thesis of IEM into question. However, as my claim is only that it is a hallmark of
normal thought that no act of identiﬁcation is required, any deviation from this norm
would give strong reason to ascribe one's thought to someone else. But as mentioned,
ascribing one's thoughts to someone else does not threaten the IEM thesis, only ascrib-
ing someone else's thought oneself.
12 I will not address factor 2 in this article as that is well beyond the scope of the
current project.
31D.M. Gray / Schizophrenia Research 152 (2014) 28–32
Author's personal copy
Conﬂict of interest
None.
Acknowledgment
I would like to thank Scott Aikin, David Pitt, Sohee Park, Susanna Siegel, Katy Thakkar,
and the anonymous reviewers at Schizophrenia Research for helpful insights and suggestions.
References
Campbell, J., 1999. Schizophrenia, the space of reasons and thinking as a motor process.
Monist 82, 609–625.
Colbert, S.M., Peters, E.R., 2002. Need for closure and jumping to conclusions in delusion
prone individuals. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 190, 27–31.
Coltheart, M., 2013. On the distinction between monothematic and polythematic delu-
sions. Mind Lang. 28, 103–112.
Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., McKay, R., 2007. Schizophrenia and monothematic delusions.
Schizophr. Bull. 33, 642–647.
Davies, M., Coltheart, M., 2000. Pathologies of belief. Mind Lang. 15, 1–46.
Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., Breen, N., 2001. Monothematic delusions: toward
a two-factor account. Philos. Psychiatry. Psychol. 8, 135–158.
Feinberg, I., 1978. Efference copy and corollary discharge: implications for thinking and
its disorders. Schizophr. Bull. 4, 636–640.
Frith, C., 1992. The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia. Erlbaum, Hove, Sussex.
Frith, C., Gallagher, S., 2002. Models of the pathological mind. J. Conscious. Stud. 4, 57–80.
Frith, C., Blakemore, S., Wolpert, D., 2000. Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia:
abnormalities in the awareness of action. Brain Res. Rev. 31, 357–363.
Garety, P.A., Hemsley, D.R., Wessely, S., 1991. Reasoning in deluded schizophrenic and
paranoid patients: biases in performance on a probabilistic inference task. J. Nerv.
Ment. Dis. 179, 194–201.
Hoerl, C., 2001. On thought insertion. Physiol. Psychiatry Psychol. 8, 189–200.
Huq, S., Garety, P., Hemsley, D., 1988. Probabilistic judgements in deluded and non-
deluded subjects. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 40A, 801–812.
Jaspers, K., 1923/1963. In: Hoenig, J., Hamilton, M.W. (Eds.), General Psychology.
Manchester University Press, Manchester.
Jones, S., Fernyhough, C., 2007. Thought as action: inner speech, self-monitoring, and
auditory verbal hallucinations. Conscious. Cogn. 16, 391–399.
Langdon, R., Ward, P., Coltheart, M., 2010. Reasoning anomalies associated with delu-
sions in schizophrenia. Schizophr. Bull. 36, 321–330.
Maher, B.A., 1974. Delusional thinking and perceptual disorder. J. Individ. Psychol. 30,
98–113.
Maher, B.A., 1992. Delusions: contemporary etiological hypotheses. Psychiatr. Ann. 22,
260–268.
Maher, B.A., 1999. Anomalous experience in everyday life: its signiﬁcance for psycho-
pathology. Monist 82, 547–570.
Megaw, E., 1972. Directional errors and their correction in a discrete tracking task. Ergo-
nomics 15, 633–643.
Moritz, S., Woodward, T., 2005. Jumping to conclusions in delusional and non-
delusional schizophrenic patients. Br. J. Clin. Psychol. 44, 193–207.
Nasrallah, H., 2012. Impaired mental proprioception in schizophrenia. Curr. Psychiatry
11, 4–5.
Sass, L., Parnas, J., 2003. Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self. Schizophr. Bull. 29,
427–444.
Sass, L., Parnas, J., 2007. Explaining Schizophrenia: The Relevance of Phenomenology.
In: Chung, M.C., Fulford, K.W.M., Graham, G. (Eds.), Reconceiving schizophrenia.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 63–95.
Sass, L., Parnas, J., Zahavi, D., 2011. Phenomenological psychopathology and schizo-
phrenia: contemporary approaches and misunderstandings. Physiol. Psychiatry
Psychol. 18, 1–23.
Seale, M., Aleman, A., Mcguire, P., 2004. Compelling imagery, unanticipated speech, and
deceptive memory: neurocognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations in
schizophrenia. Cogn. Neuropsychiatr. 9, 43–72.
Shoemaker, S., 1968. Self-reference and self-awareness. J. Philos. 65, 555–567.
Stone, T., Young, A.W., 1997. Delusions and brain injury: the philosophy and psychology of
belief. Mind Lang. 12, 327–364.
Thakkar, K.N., Schall, J.D., Heckers, S., Park, S., 2013. Altered corollary discharge in the
saccadic eye movement system of patients with schizophrenia. Poster Presented
at the Annual Meeting of the International Congress on Schizophrenia Research.
In: Abstracts for the 14th International Congress on Schizophrenia Research.
Schizophr. Bull. 39 (Suppl. 1), S276–S277 (Orlando, FL).
Whitford, T., Ford, J., Mathalon, D., Kubicki, M., Shenton, M., 2012. Schizophrenia,
myelination, and delayed corollary discharges: a hypothesis. Schizophr. Bull. 38,
486–494.
Wittgenstein, L., 1958. The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philo-
sophical Investigations’. Harper and Row, New York.
Young, H., Bentall, R., 1997. Probabilistic reasoning in deluded, depressed and normal
subjects: Effects of task difﬁculty and meaningful versus non-meaningful material.
Psychol. Med. 27, 455–465.
32 D.M. Gray / Schizophrenia Research 152 (2014) 28–32
